Showing posts with label constructive discharge. Show all posts
Showing posts with label constructive discharge. Show all posts

Sunday, 26 May 2013

Court of Appeal Affirms Summary Judgment on Sexual Harassment Claim and More

The Court of Appeal's decision in McCoy v. Pacific Maritime Association covers a lot of ground.  The opinion contains analysis of a variety of issues important for pre-trial and trial lawyers alike.

Here are the main issues -

1. The plaintiff's allegations of hostile work environment harassment and intentional infliction of emotional distress were not severe / pervasive / extreme / outrageous enough to reach the jury.  The plaintiff's claim is summarized here:

Appellant testified that she was harassed and shunned throughout her training period. Her complaints centered around one vessel planner in particular, Anthony Spanjol. Appellant testified that Spanjol would disrespect her by talking down to her and by putting his feet up on her work space. On one occasion, he yelled at her in front of other employees and called her stupid. One of appellant‟s supervisors, Marc Izzo, witnessed this incident, but left the room rather than address it. Appellant testified that when she complained about the incident she was told that she should go home and that Spanjol‟s behavior was just a part of his personality. She also stated that Spanjol often made racially derogatory remarks and engaged in sexually offensive behavior. He would comment on the buttocks of other female employees once they left the room, using terms like "„nigger ass‟" and "„J-Lo ass.‟" On at least one occasion, Spanjol also made crude gestures toward a woman when the woman‟s back was turned. He also mocked these women in appellant‟s presence. During another incident, appellant asked Spanjol a question regarding the unloading of a ship, but he ignored her and "never spoke to [her] again." Appellant testified that shortly after this incident she decided she could no longer handle the work environment and quit her job entirely.
The court held that the harassment was not severe or pervasive enough to require a jury's consideration. The court also held that the allegations of co-worker harassment were not actionable because the plaintiff did not prove that her employer knew or should have known of the conduct directed toward her.

2.  The court held that the trial court properly excluded evidence of harassment of other women because the only claim tried was retaliation.

3.   "Me-too" evidence of retaliation against other women should have been admitted.

4.   The plaintiff claimed denial of promotion based on retaliation. The court held she was entitled to damages if she prevailed even if she did not prove constructive discharge. The amount of those damages would have to be limited to what she actually lost (the difference between her pay and the pay if she had been promoted).  I don't understand how she would be entitled to that differential after she quit if it's not a constructive discharge.  If you voluntarily quit, you no longer receive pay...  I know, there I go thinking again.

5.   The court held that PMA, an association that negotiated collective bargaining agreements, was not the plaintiff's employer, and therefore could not be held liable for retaliation or other FEHA based actions.

So, lots of reasons to cite this case.  It's long, but worth reading.  The opinion in McCoy v. Pacific Maritime Association is here.

DGV
 

Sunday, 22 July 2007

9th Circuit Sets Low Bar on Employer Liability for Employees' Conduct

Poland was with the Customs Service in Denver. Hillberry was his supervisor. Hillberry demonstrated some anti-age animus towards Poland. Poland at some point filed a charge of discrimination. Later, Hillberry requested an administrative review of Poland's management of subordinates. The reviewers found that Poland engaged in unprofessional conduct as a manager. As a result, Poland was demoted to a non-supervisory job and transferred to Vienna Virginia.
Poland accepted the transfer, but retired 3 years before the mandatory retirement age.

Poland sued for, among other things, retaliation and constructive discharge. He said that the administrative review was retaliation for his age discrimination claim. The trial court awarded damages for constructive discharge and retaliation.

The Ninth Circuit reversed on the constructive discharge claim. 2/3 of the judges said that Poland did not establish his working conditions were intolerable merely because he was demoted and transferred. Among other things, the court noted that Poland worked 5 months in Virginia, contradicting his argument the transfer created intolerable conditions.

The really significant part of the case, though, is the Ninth Circuit's stance on liability for actions taken by innocent superiors on the basis of lower level employees' complaints. Hillberry did instigate the investigation into Poland's conduct, true. But the court did not rely on that alone and said that Hillberry's referral alone would not have been enough. Rather, the court focused on the fact that the investigators had access to Hillberry's notes, that Hillberry gave the list of witnesses to the investigators, and that the panel relied on performance reviews that had increased in frequency after Poland filed his first discrimination complaint.

In upholding Poland's claim, the court announced the rule for holding employers liable for negative, non-discriminatory actions taken on the basis of an employee's complaint that is tainted by bias:

We hold that if a subordinate, in response to a plaintiff’s protected activity, sets in motion a proceeding by an independent decisionmaker that leads to an adverse employment action, the subordinate’s bias is imputed to the employer if the plaintiff can prove that the allegedly independent adverse employment decision was not actually independent because the biased subordinate influenced or was involved in the decision or decisionmaking process.

The court added that if the investigation is "entirely independent" of the subordinate's influence, the animus of the retaliating employee is not imputed to the employer.

So, if an employee engages in protected activity by complaining against a manager, that manager cannot be the impetus for negative treatment against the complaining employee, unless an "entirely independent" investigation finds the negative treatment is justified. Otherwise, the odds of a retaliation finding are very high.

The case is Poland v. Chertoff. Opinion is here.