American Medical Association Creates Millions of New "Individuals With Disabilities"

At its June 18, 2013 annual meeting, the American Medical Association decided a new "policy":

Obesity as a Disease 

Today, the AMA adopted policy that recognizes obesity as a disease requiring a range of medical interventions to advance obesity treatment and prevention.
“Recognizing obesity as a disease will help change the way the medical community tackles this complex issue that affects approximately one in three Americans,” said AMA board member Patrice Harris, M.D. “The AMA is committed to improving health outcomes and is working to reduce the incidence of cardiovascular disease and type 2 diabetes, which are often linked to obesity.

The link is here.

Although the effect of this "policy" will have on employment law is unclear, the move could significantly increase ADA / disability discrimination and impose huge new reasonable accommodation obligations on employers. Why? Courts in the past generally have found that obesity in and of itself is not a covered "disability," but its effects (like high blood pressure, type 2 diabetes, heart disease) could be.  (We wrote about this some time ago here.)  If obesity itself is not a disability, the employer would not have a duty to accommodate an obese worker merely because the employee desired adjustments to the work area, for example. It should be noted, though, that some courts more recently have begun to recognize that significantly overweight people might have disabilities or at least be "regarded" as disabled.  The ADA Amendments Act's looser definition of "disability" is making it easier for courts to hold that an employee with nearly any impairment has a disability.

Anyway, if the AMA's recent policy results in more protection for the overweight as "disabled," without a showing of medical complications, then there could be a significant expansion of the duty to accommodate. Employers may have to take into account the obese in office space planning, ergonomics, etc.  What about physical job requirements?  And what of employers who do not hire the obese, or who require / encourage "wellness" plans for the heavyset?  Obese applicants, too, may be able to claim they were not selected due to their disability without any showing that the employer was aware of a latent disability.  

Of course "obesity" is a medical term and does not apply to all overweight people.  And it's too early to know what the AMA's policy statement will mean. But it's worth keeping an eye on this issue and planning for the future.

SV Makes Some Law: No Section 1983 Claims Based on ADA

It's nice to blog about one of your own cases, and even better when it's a victory.  So, Josephine Okwu was a Caltrans employee, who agreed to disability retirement status.  She then wanted to be reinstated from disability retirement status to her former job. Denied, she was unsuccessful under civil service procedure. She then sued CalPERS and Caltrans officials in federal court under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 for violation of her civil rights.

She had to rely on Section 1983, she believed, because she could not sue her employer, Caltrans, under the Eleventh Amendment.  She could not sue CalPERS, either.  She could not use the ADA to sue the individuals in any court, because individuals cannot be held liable under the ADA.

The district court dismissed the case because Section 1983 cannot be used as a substitute claim for ADA claims that are not viable in federal court. The Ninth Circuit affirmed:

We conclude that Congress’s inclusion of a comprehensive remedial scheme in Title I of the ADA precludes § 1983 claims predicated on alleged violations of ADA Title I substantive rights. We also conclude that Okwu’s allegations of fact do not state a claim under the Equal Protection Clause. We therefore affirm.

The case is Okwu v. McKim and the opinion is here.

9th Circuit Agrees that Medical Marijuana Users Not Protected by ADA

In 2008, the California Supreme Court held in Ross v. Ragingwire Telecomm. Inc. that the California Fair Employment and Housing Act does not protect current users of medical marijuana.  Post here.  Article here.

The Ninth Circuit just held (2-1) that the federal ADA excludes from coverage current illegal drug users and that "illegal" includes marijuana use that would be lawful in California, but is unlawful under federal law:

We hold that doctor-recommended marijuana use permitted by state law, but prohibited by federal law, is an illegal use of drugs for purposes of the ADA, and that the plaintiffs' federally proscribed medical marijuana use therefore brings them within the ADA's illegal drug exclusion. This conclusion is not altered by recent congressional actions allowing the implementation of the District of Columbia's local medical marijuana initiative.

The case is James v. Costa Mesa and the opinion is here.

Ninth Circuit Holds Regular Attendance Is Essential Job Function for a Nurse

Some welcome, common sense ADA analysis.  When a job must be performed at the job site, and the employee is not a fungible member of a group of similar workers who can each replace each other, the employer can require regular attendance as a job requirement.

Monika Samper was a neo natal nurse at a Providence Hospital.  She claimed to have Fibromyalgia, which resulted in poor attendance. She violated the attendance policy and was fired.  She wanted essentially a waiver from the policy.

No sale.

It is a “rather common-sense idea . . . that if one is not able to be at work, one cannot be a qualified individual.” Waggoner v. Olin Corp., 169 F.3d 481, 482 (7th Cir. 1999). Both before and since the passage of the ADA, a majority of circuits have endorsed the proposition that in those jobs where performance requires attendance at the job, irregular attendance compromises essential job functions. Attendance may be necessary for a variety of reasons. Sometimes, it is required simply because the employee must work as “part of a team.” Hypes v. First Commerce Corp., 134 F.3d 721, 727 (5th Cir. 1998). Other jobs require face-to-face interaction with clients and other employees. Nowak v. St. Rita High Sch., 142 F.3d 999 (7th Cir. 1998) (teacher); Nesser v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 160 F.3d 442 (8th Cir. 1998) (airline customer service agent); Tyndall v. Nat’l Educ. Ctrs., 31 F.3d 209 (4th Cir. 1994) (teacher). Yet other jobs require the employee to work with items and equipment that are on site. EEOC v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 253 F.3d 943 (7th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (dockworker); Jovanovic v. In-Sink-Erator, 201 F.3d 894 (7th Cir. 2000) (tool and die maker); Waggoner, 169 F.3d 481 (production worker); Corder v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 162 F.3d 924 (7th Cir. 1998) (telephone customer support); Halperin v. Abacus Tech. Corp., 128 F.3d 191 (4th Cir. 1997) (computer consultant); Rogers v. Int’l Marine Terminals, Inc., 87 F.3d 755 (5th Cir. 1996) (mechanic); Jackson v.Veterans Admin., 22 F.3d 277 (11th Cir. 1994) (housekeeping aide); Carr v. Reno, 23 F.3d 525 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (coding clerk under the Rehabilitation Act); Law v. U.S. Postal Serv., 852 F.2d 1278 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (mail handler under the Rehabilitation Act).

The common-sense notion that on-site regular attendance is an essential job function could hardly be more illustrative than in the context of a neo-natal nurse. This at-risk patient population cries out for constant vigilance, team coordination and continuity. As a NICU nurse, Samper’s job unites the trinity of requirements that make regular on-site presence necessary for regular performance: teamwork, faceto-face interaction with patients and their families, and working with medical equipment face interaction with patients and their families, and working with medical equipment. Samper herself admits that her absences sometimes affected “teamwork and cause[d] a hardship for [her] coworkers who must cover for [her].” Similarly, once at work, Samper’s tasks required her to “lift babies, push cribs and isolettes.” More critically, she had to “get up at a moment’s notice to answer alarms [and] . . . [o]ften . . . run to codes.”
****
Samper’s performance is predicated on her attendance; reliable, dependable performance requires reliable and dependable attendance. An employer need not provide accommodations that compromise performance quality—to require a hospital to do so could, quite literally, be fatal.

Zing. The case is Samper v. Providence St. Vincent Med. Ctr. and the opinion is here.

U.S. Supreme Court on Ministerial Exception to Title VII

The U.S. Supreme Court decided for the first time that there is a "ministerial exception" to anti-discrimination laws such as the ADA. The lower courts for many years recognized that exception.

At issue was Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School and its discharge of a former teacher, Cheryl Perich. Perich was classified as a "called" teacher, rather than a "lay" one. Called teachers have to satisfy certain requirements, cannot be removed except for cause and by a vote of the congregation, and hold the title “Minister of Religion, Commissioned.”

As a called teacher, Perich 

taught math, language arts, social stud- ies, science, gym, art, and music. She also taught a reli- gion class four days a week, led the students in prayer and devotional exercises each day, and attended a weekly school-wide chapel service. Perich led the chapel service herself about twice a year.

Perich developed symptoms of narcolepsy, which resulted in her inability to perform her job. She later was discharged, after she threatened to file a Charge. The EEOC took up her case and sued on her behalf.

The District Court dismissed the case; the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that a retaliation claim under the ADA could proceed against the Church.
The unanimous Court, recognizing there is a ministerial exception, put it this way:

We agree that there is such a ministerial exception. The members of a religious group put their faith in the hands of their ministers. Requiring a church to accept or retain an unwanted minister, or punishing a church for failing to do so, intrudes upon more than a mere employment decision. Such action interferes with the internal governance of the church, depriving the church of control over the selection of those who will personify its beliefs. By imposing an unwanted minister, the state infringes the Free Exercise Clause, which protects a religious group’s right to shape its own faith and mission through its appointments.

The Court did not set out a specific test, but noted that (1) the Church held Perich out to be a minister (2) the Church had a ceremony and the congregation was involved in her investiture (3) she had significant religious training as a prerequisite (4) she held herself out to be a minister and even took a special tax deduction applicable only to members of a ministry (5) her duties involved significant religious teaching activities.


Based on that, the Court decided that Perich met the standards of the ministerial exemption.  The Court was careful to note that the term "minister" was misleading because the exception applies to religions that do not include "ministers."  The Court also refused to address the "parade of horribles" the EEOC argued, such as that Church employers would be exempt from wage-hour or criminal violations towards "ministerial" employees.  


The case is Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. Perich and the opinion is here.

Ninth Circuit: No Duty to Accommodate Unqualified Applicant With Disability

Trish Johnson was a special education teacher. She was required to maintain a teacher certification. To do so, she had to satisfy certain continuing education requirements, including having 3 hours of college credit over a five year period.  Johnson failed to complete the college credit on time and told her bosses she would lose her certification. Her school district could have petitioned the state for an exemption, but declined to do so. Johnson lost her certification and was fired.
She sued under the ADA, claiming the school district had to apply for and obtain the exemption as a form of accommodation of her depression and other mental impairments.
Agreeing with the district court, the Ninth Circuit upheld summary judgment. The court held that a plaintiff under the ADA must establish she is a "qualified individual with a disability" or no accommodation is due.
The court noted EEOC regulations provide "that a 'qualified individual with a disability' is one 'who satisfies the requisite skills, experience, education and other job related requirements of the employment position such individual holds or desires, and who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of such position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (emphasis added).
So, the court reasoned, Johnson was required to hold the "requisite" job related requirements of the job without accommodation. She did not maintain the requisite continuing education requirements and, therefore, lost her certification.
So, by way of example given in the opinion, an employer hiring a CPA can require the CPA to be licensed and need not provide "accommodation" that helps the applicant obtain the license (like tutoring).  A law firm does not have to help a law clerk pass the bar, etc.
The case is Johnson v. Bd. of Trustees and the opinion is here.

Ninth Circuit: Ban on Applicants Who Test Positive for Drugs Not ADA Violation

The Pacific Maritime Association has a "one-strike" rule. If you fail a drug or alcohol test during the applicant screening process, you are barred from consideration for employment. Forever.

Santiago Lopez applied for a longshoreman's job, but he tested positive for marijuana. He claims that when he applied, he was addicted. But once he become a recovering addict, he was entitled to reapply with the protections of the ADA.

The Ninth Circuit disagreed, upholding summary judgment. The court said that the one-strike rule applies to anyone who fails a drug/alcohol test, not just addicts or recovering addicts. The employer also had no knowledge that Lopez was a recovering addict, only that he previously had failed the test.

A dissenting judge in this 2-1 opinion would have given Lopez a chance to save his disparate impact claim. Lopez argued that a rule barring all persons from re-applying could have a "disparate impact" on recovering alcoholics/drug abusers. But Lopez did not support that argument with statistical proof and, therefore, the court did not allow the claim to proceed.

The case is Lopez v. Pacific Maritime Association and the opinion is here.

Ninth Circuit: Triable Issue on Accommodation of Hearing Impaired

The EEOC brought suit against UPS Supply Chain Solutions for failing to accommodate a hearing impaired employee. The employee, Mauricio Centeno, was deaf since birth and American Sign Language was his primary language.

He was able to do his job in accounting without a sign language interpreter. But he asked for an interpreter at company meetings. The employer offered post-meeting recaps in writing and contemporaneous notes during the meetings. He also wanted an interpreter's help with respect to certain job training and to understand the company's sexual harassment policy.

The district court granted UPS' motion for summary judgment because, it found, UPS had engaged in an interactive process with Centeno and had provided accommodations that were sufficient to enable Centeno to understand what transpired at meetings, etc.

But the court of appeals reversed. The appellate court held it was a genuine dispute of fact regarding whether the accommodations were effective. The court decided that agendas, contemporaneous notes, and summaries in English were not necessarily sufficient substitutes for a sign language interpreter. The court was especially concerned because Centeno was not proficient at written English, but the court also said it would be a triable issue even if Centeno were fluent in English.

Similarly, the court held that UPS may have failed to accommodate Centeno by delaying Excel training. Centeno claimed he could not read the online training program and required an interpreter. UPS ultimately provided him one, but two years later.

Centeno also complained he did not understand the company's anti-harassment policy and training materials because he was not given a sign language interpreter to read them. The court held that Centeno's professed lack of comprehension was sufficient to put UPS on notice that an accommodation was necessary.

This case raises the bar for employers who employ hearing impaired employees. Even when the hearing impaired can perform essential job functions without interpreters, they may be necessary so the employee can enjoy the "benefits and privileges" of employment.

The opinion is EEOC v. UPS Supply Chain Solutions and the opinion is here.

9th Circuit: No Jury, Compensatory or Punitive Damages for ADA Retaliation

Alvarado sued his former employer, Cajun Operating Co., for retaliation because he complained to an internal hotline about discrimination based on disability, national origin, etc. Before trial, the court granted a motion in limine barring Alvarado's punitive damages, compensatory damage, and jury trial demand. The Ninth Circuit affirmed on appeal.

The analysis is interesting if you like statutory construction cases. I know what you're thinking: Zzz. If you just want the punchline - the Ninth Circuit joined the Seventh in holding that the Americans With Disabilities Act does not provide for compensatory or punitive damages in retaliation cases asserted under the ADA. As with pre-Civil Rights Act of 1991 cases, the only relief available is equitable, which removes the jury trial too. My bold prediction is that Congress will fix this issue in a few weeks or months.

The case is Alvarado v. Cajun Operating Co. and the decision is here.

California Supreme Court LOVES litigation

The California Supreme Court continued its streak of pro-litigation decisions today. What am I talking about? The recent "Tobacco Cases," - expanding the availability of unfair business practice class actions, the anti-arbitration decisions, the pro-class action certification opinions, the Court's common theme lately seems to be - lawsuits good! Too bad the courts are struggling for funds to hear all these cases, there are few disincentives to bring frivolous litigation, and businesses already on shaky financial ground can't afford to be in court. OK, down off the soapbox.

Anyway, in this most recent installment, the California high court considered certified questions from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, including whether proof of intentional discrimination is a required element of claims brought under the Unruh Civil Rights Act. The Unruh Act is the civil rights law that protects the public from discrimination in places of public accommodation. It's the principal state law used in disability access cases. Money damages are available for violations, making the Unruh Act more interesting than laws permitting only injunctions.

This is not an employment law case per se. But many employers operate businesses that are subject to the Unruh Act (retail, restaurants hospitals, etc.) . So, I thought I would mention this case.

The Unruh Act says that a violation of Title III of the ADA (prohibiting discriminating in public accommodations by failure to make facilities accessible) is also a violation of the Unruh Act. The Court decided that because the ADA does not require intentional discrimination in access cases, neither did the Unruh Act. (The rest of the Unruh Act, prohibiting discrimination on a variety of bases, does require intentional discrimination, though, which is why the Supreme Court had to decide the case).

So, disability access litigation is alive and well! The case is Munson v. Del Taco, and the opinion is here.

California FEHC Compares ADA, ADAAA and FEHA

The California Fair Employment and Housing Commission issued a handy chart comparing the original Americans with Disabilities Act, the 2008 amendments (ADAAA), and the Fair Employment and Housing Act's coverage of individuals with disabilities. Here is the chart.

Ninth Circuit Holds Type 2 Diabetic Was Qualified Individual

The Ninth Circuit avoided deciding whether the ADAAA amendments to the ADA are retroactive by holding that a type-2 diabetic had a disability and was a qualified individual under the original ADA.

Larry Rohr was a welder metallurgy specialist for Salt River Project Ag. Improvement and Power District, a political subdivision of the Arizona state government. He developed type-2 diabetes. His doctors imposed a number of restrictions on his diet and prescribed medication. The timing and management of his blood sugar testing, eating, and administration of medication resulted in a number of restrictions. Additionally, because of his medical condition, he was susceptible to a number of symptoms.

At times, Rohr was assigned to work in the field and out of town trips. His doctors, and the company's imposed a number of restrictions on his work, which included extended travel. Ultimately, the company concluded he could not perform his essential job functions and gave him the opportunity to transfer to another job or take early retirement. He sued for disability discrimination under the ADA. The district court granted summary judgment, holding he was not an individual with a "disability" and that he was not "qualified"

The Ninth Circuit disagreed. The opinion discusses at length the limitations on Rohr's ability to eat, including scheduling his meals, eating at certain times, and adjusting medication for food, testing and exercise. The court said not all diabetics are substantially limited, but that Rohr had a number of challenges that seem common to many with the condition. So, particularly under the new ADAAA amendments, it will be nearly impossible to argue diabetes is not a disability after this opinion.

The court then tackled whether Rohr was "qualified" in that he could perform his essential job functions with or without accommodation. Salt River argued Rohr could not pass a respirator test per OSHA standards. The court found a triable issue of fact because: the test was not required by OSHA, Salt River did not consider other testing methods, and the use of a respirator may not have been "necessary" to the job.

The court rather summarily found the parties' disputed whether aspects of Rohr's job were "essential" including the need to travel extensively.

The court also decided that the ADAAA amendments would have lent further support to the conclusion that summary judgment should be reversed. However, the court declined to rule that the amendments applied to Rohr's case, which was filed long before the president signed the 2008 amendments into law. The court's comments on the ADAAA, all dicta, portend tough sledding for employers seeking to challenge whether someone has a "disability" under the new framework.

The deicsion is Rohr v. Salt River Project and the opinion is here.

President Signs ADA Amendments Act

President Bush signed a bill significantly reforming the Americans With Disabilities Act. The new law, which takes effect on January 1, 2009, primarily overturns 9 years of case law interpreting the definition of "disability" under the ADA. Our article on the new law is here. The text of the law is here. Acronym lovers will likely be disappointed by "ADAAA."

DGV